Animal societies vary widely in the distribution of reproduction among individuals (Keller & Reeve 1994) . At one extreme are those that exhibit a high level of reproductive skew, with one or a few individuals monopolizing direct reproduction; examples include the colonies of many eusocial ants (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990; Bourke & Franks 1995) , and of the naked mole-rat, Heterocephalus glaber (Jarvis 1991). At the other extreme are low-skew societies, for example, the multiple-queen colonies of some polistine and polybiine wasps (see Bourke 1997), or vertebrate societies such as those of the banded mongoose, Mungos mungo (Rood 1986) or groove-billed ani, Crotophaga sulcirostris (Vehrencamp et al. 1988) , in which reproduction is shared equally between group members.
What determines the stable level of skew in any particular society? Until recently, models of reproductive partitioning have made the simplifying assumption that reproductive competition will always be resolved in favour of the dominant members of the group, who can exert full control over the allocation of breeding opportunities (Vehrencamp 1979 (Vehrencamp , 1983a Reeve & Ratnieks 1993; Reeve & Keller 1995; Johnstone et al., in press ). Subordinates are thus expected to receive a share of direct reproduction only if this incentive is needed to persuade them to stay and help with offspring care, rather than leaving or fighting to achieve dominance themselves. In reality, however, control of breeding by dominants may often be incomplete or absent, so that subordinates can claim a degree of unsanctioned reproduction for themselves (Reeve & Ratnieks 1993; Cant 1998; Clutton-Brock 1998; Reeve et al. 1998) .
When dominants cannot entirely prevent subordinates from breeding, they stand to gain by eliminating unsanctioned young; equally, subordinates stand to gain by eliminating (if they can) the rival young of dominants. Incomplete control of reproduction in communal breeders thus sets the stage for the evolution of infanticide (e.g. Mumme et al. 1983; Koford et al. 1990; Bourke 1991; Heinze et al. 1992; Medeiros et al. 1992; Reeve & Nonacs 1992; Koenig et al. 1995) . Infanticidal behaviour may, in turn, affect the payoffs that dominants and subordinates stand to gain by producing young, and thus influence the pattern of reproduction within the group.
While the benefits of eliminating the offspring of competitors are clear, infanticidal behaviour is often likely to be constrained by the difficulty of distinguishing
